In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 67.1 (2006) 149-179 [Access article in PDF] The Problem of "Misplaced Ideas" Revisited: Beyond the "History of Ideas" in Latin America Elías José Palti Universidad Nacional de Quilmes—CONICET The change that has come over this branch of historiography in the past two decades may be characterized as a movement away from emphasizing history of thought (and even more sharply, "of ideas") toward (...) emphasizing something rather different, for which "history of speech" or "history of discourse," if not unproblematic or irreproachable, may be the best terminology so far found J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History1In 1973, Roberto Schwarz published a paper that profoundly marked a generation of thinkers in Latin America: "As idéias fora do lugar" ("Misplaced Ideas").2 It was originally intended to provide a theoretical framework for "progressivist" authors to counter the influence of nationalistic tendencies that, in the 1960s and 1970s, were particularly noticeable among the leftist political organizations.3 Yet, the concept of "misplaced [End Page 149] ideas" soon proved especially productive for theorizing the problematic development of ideas in Latin American history. Schwarz's text thus became the fundamental point of reference for those in the field who intended to question the hitherto predominant paradigms in cultural and literary critique, which were mostly inspired by the Romantic-nationalistic tradition. Notwithstanding, a quarter of a century later, Schwarz's original contribution in this regard needs to be reassessed. In the course of the last twenty-five years, the apparent loss of the national states' centrality helped to reveal the inherent complexity of the processes of cultural exchange hidden behind a perspective that still tended to conceive of them exclusively in terms of inter-national relationships. Furthermore, a series of new developments in the disciplines specifically dedicated to analyzing those kinds of exchange processes compels us to reconsider some of the implicit assumptions in Schwarz's concept and reformulate it.The object of this paper is to explore, in the light of the new realities of the last fin-de-siècle, new perspectives regarding the dynamic of ideas and cultural exchange in peripheral areas (of which Latin American is only a particular case), utilizing the new conceptual tools provided by the recently developed disciplines and theories in the field. Ultimately, the present work intends to raise a broader, epistemological, issue, whose relevance exceeds the local context. As it shows, the shortcomings in Schwarz's theory spring from a crude linguistic view, which is inherent in the "history of ideas," that reduces language exclusively to its referential function. A more precise distinction of the different levels of language will thus help to reveal aspects and problems that Schwarz's perspective obliterates. Yet, as this paper also intends to demonstrate, Schwarz's original intellectual project may be disentangled from its linguistic premises and recovered for cultural critique. Applied in a new way, it can still provide a theoretical framework to comprehend the intricacies of the processes of cultural exchange, and, more specifically, the problematic dynamics of ideas in Latin America that Schwarz intended to analyze. On Places and Non-Places of Ideas In order to understand the sense of Schwarz's notion of "misplaced ideas" we must place it within the conceptual framework in which it emerged. With it, Schwarz aimed to translate into a cultural key the postulates of the so-called "dependency theory," the core of which took shape in the "Seminar [End Page 150] on Marx," organized in São Paulo in the early 1960s (and in which Schwarz participated). As is well known, that theory intended to refute the "dualistic" approaches that viewed the peripheral areas as vestiges of a precapitalistic world that tends historically to disappear. The nations in this area would thus replicate the same pattern of linear development of central countries. On the contrary, dependency theory postulated the existence of a complex dynamic between the center and the periphery, the two representing instances inherent in capitalist development, thus forming a single, interconnected system. According to... (shrink)

The crisis of the belief -nowadays considered native- in the possibility of getting rid of our own concepts, or prejudces, and gaining a more of less immediate access to, achieving a more or less transparent insight in, those cultures alien to us pushed anthropologists ot begin to explore in the very conditions of possibility of the anthropological discuorse itself. Thus, the same series of transformations that undermined many evident, opened also new horizons of enquire paving the way to a process (...) of growing self-reflectiveness of the discipline. This process is particularly noticeable in the United States, where theoretical anthropology has had a vertiginous development in the last two decades in connection with the development of what is known as «postgeertzian anthropology». The present article outlines the different stages through which theoretical anthropology crossed in North America in its attempt to make sense of its own epistemic and institutional conditions of possibility, as well as the diverse problems that in the distinct phases of this development it faced. (shrink)

Mi propósito en este trabajo es reconsiderar una de las lecturas más relevantes y provocativas que se han hecho sobre John Dewey en el mundo de habla hispana. En la primera parte reconstruyo las circunstancias que rodearon la difusión, interpretación y traducción de las obras de Dewey en el México de mediados de los años 1940, y en concreto las razones que llevaron a que la visión sociológica que José Medina Echavarría quiso dar de Dewey fuera finalmente desplazada por la (...) filosófica de José Gaos. En la segunda parte analizo la traducción y lectura que Gaos hizo de Experience and Nature de Dewey, teniendo muy presente sus comparaciones con Sein und Zeit de Heidegger . Finalmente, propongo algunas críticas a la visión que Gaos transmite de Dewey como un pensador carente de un tipo de "soberbia diabólica" propia de la verdadera gran filosofía. The purpose of this work is a reconsideration of one of the most relevant and provocative readings of John Dewey written in the Hispanic World. In the first part I reconstruct the circumstances which surrounded the publicity, interpretation and translation of John Dewey's works in the Mexico of the middle 1940's, particularly the reasons why the sociological reading of Dewey that José Medina Echavarría proposed was finally displaced by the metaphysic perspective of José Gaos. In the second part I reconsider Gaos' own translation and interpretation of Experience and Nature, taking in consideration his comparisons with Heidegger's Sein und Zeit . Finally I analyze critically Gaos' view of Dewey as a thinker whose philosophy lacked the "diabolical arrogance" that true great philosophy would seem to require. (shrink)

Advancements in novel neurotechnologies, such as brain computer interfaces and neuromodulatory devices such as deep brain stimulators, will have profound implications for society and human rights. While these technologies are improving the diagnosis and treatment of mental and neurological diseases, they can also alter individual agency and estrange those using neurotechnologies from their sense of self, challenging basic notions of what it means to be human. As an international coalition of interdisciplinary scholars and practitioners, we examine these challenges and make (...) recommendations to mitigate negative consequences that could arise from the unregulated development or application of novel neurotechnologies. We explore potential ethical challenges in four key areas: identity and agency, privacy, bias, and enhancement. To address them, we propose democratic and inclusive summits to establish globally-coordinated ethical and societal guidelines for neurotechnology development and application, new measures, including “Neurorights,” for data privacy, security, and consent to empower neurotechnology users’ control over their data, new methods of identifying and preventing bias, and the adoption of public guidelines for safe and equitable distribution of neurotechnological devices. (shrink)

Eudaimony and destiny.- Almost all the classical theories on ethics place man's objective as his search for happiness. This ideal is based on nature. Medieval thinkers, considering man as a person, came to the conclusion that he is called t o a transcendental destiny; however, because they continued to use the classical ideal of happiness as a conceptual model, they created quite a few difficulties: self-transcendence and self-fulfillment are opposing models. L. Polo, on the other hand, proposes a non-naturalist (...) anthropology that considers each person as destined to transcendence. (shrink)

Almost all the classical theories on ethics place man's objective as his search for happiness. This ideal is based on nature. Medieval thinkers, considering man as a person, came to the conclusion that he is called to a transcendental destiny; however, because they continued to use the classical ideal of happiness as a concenptual model, they created quite a few difficulties: self-transcendence and self-fulfillment are opposing models. L. Polo, on the other hand, proposes a non-naturalist anthropology that considers each (...) person as destined to transcendence. (shrink)

En el tomo II de la Antropología trascendental, L. Polo estudia la esencia humana de acuerdo con el método del abandono del límite mental. La esencia aparece entonces como la manifestación y el disponer de la persona, que hace posible la constitución del don que completa la estructura donal del amar y el aceptar personal. La tarea de constituir el don toma el relevo a la búsqueda de réplica, que no puede alcanzar su tema, al ser éste inaccesible al (...) intelecto personal. (shrink)

Este artículo es una exposición y explicación de la descripción del trascendental “amar” como extensión de la intimidad, la libertad y el intelecto personal de la persona humana, es decir, de la persona que carece de réplica y debe “buscar” y amar donalmente a Dios. Como la estructura donal es trina, se exponen y explican también las indicaciones de Polo sobre la esencia del hombre y, más en concreto, sobre la voluntad, el querer libre y el “retorno” de la (...) esencia a la persona para completar dicha estructura. (shrink)

En este escrito se discutirá si tienen significado las oraciones que contienen nombres vacíos y si hay proposiciones verdaderas que contienen nombres vacíos. La respuesta a ambas preguntas parece ser positiva, cuyos casos paradigmáticos son enunciados como “Hamlet es un ser humano” y “Santa Claus vive en el Polo Norte”. Se asume, además, que estos enunciados expresan proposiciones distintas, pues su contenido semántico es distinto. Se argumenta que los nombres vacíos realizan una _contribución semántica degenerada _o no referencial a (...) las proposiciones en las que aparecen. Si ello es correcto, el problema de los nombres vacíos tiene una solución desde la teoría de la referencia directa. Se defiende además que un nombre vacío es un término singular rígidamente no referencial. (shrink)

El jesuita morisco P. Ignacio de las Casas colaboró en la traducción de algunos de los libros plúmbeos encontrados en Granada a fines del siglo XVI. Inicialmente se manifestó partidario de su autenticidad, pero pronto se convenció de que eran una falsificación. Desarrolló entonces una activa lucha para conseguir que la Iglesia evitara su divulgación. En el artículo se pasa revista a su intervención como traductor y a los argumentos que utilizó para criticar la doctrina de los libros plúmbeos. El (...) P. Las Casas, además de señalar la presencia de elementos islámicos, ve en ellos claras muestras de antiguas herejías antitrinitarias. Aunque no los considera obra de moriscos, señala el atractivo que el mesianismo y milenarismo contenidos en la doctrina de los libros plúmbeos tenía para los moriscos. (shrink)

Hablar de educación hoy en día no revela nada novedoso para una sociedad del conocimiento que tiene mil entradas sobre el mismo tema. No obstante, el presente escrito intentará reconstruir qué entendía el filósofo y pensador nortesantandereano José Rafael Faría Bermúdez sobre esta labor a lo largo de los procesos fundacionales que lideró; es decir, desde la creación del Colegio del Norte hasta la creación de la Universidad de Pamplona. Para esto retomaremos tres puntos que construyen su idea sobre (...) educar. Primero, se tomará la pregunta ¿qué es educar para la vida?; segundo, se analizará la perspectiva con que Faría entendía el papel del estudiante que pregunta con aplomo; y, tercero, se espera responder por qué debemos estudiar con amor. Esto enmarcado desde una metodología descriptiva que apunta a una reconstrucción cualitativa de su pensamiento a partir de sus principales obras. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo exponer el pensamiento del filósofo nortesantandereano Pbro. José Rafael Faría Bermúdez en torno de la apologética cristiana y la importancia de la discusión entre la religión y el marxismo en los años cuarenta en Colombia. Ese momento es importante en la medida en que la enseñanza de la religión se ve concretamente afectada por la incidencia de las doctrinas materialistas y comunistas en el pensamiento cristiano colombiano y nortesantandereano.Faría afirma que partiendo de postulados comunistas (...) el marxismo enseña: la negación de toda propiedad privada, la igualdad absoluta de los hombres, el odio de los pobres a los ricos y la guerra a Dios y a toda religión. Esta doctrina se torna una amenaza para el pensador cristiano pues formula un falso sistema cuyas enseñanzas son detestables. Partiendo de esta idea Faría defiende al cristianismo del ataque al que se ve expuesto el pueblo de Dios. (shrink)

El conocido pensador refuta la antropología moderna y brinda argumentos aún más profundos.

Con este trabajo se pretende mostrar el pensamiento de FriedrichWilhelm Nietzsche. Para ello considero vital ponerlo en relación con elhegelianismo y, muy interesante, dividir su pensamiento de la mismamanera que Don Leonardo Polo lleva a cabo en su obra “Nietzsche comopensador de dualidades”, esto es, por un lado, desarrollando la Parsdestruens, en este caso centrándonos en la obra de Nietzsche “Sobreverdad y mentira en sentido extramoral” y, por otro lado, indagando en el concepto del símbolo, intentando sacar a la (...) luz la importancia capital de dicho concepto en la filosofía del célebre pensador alemán. (shrink)

The interpretation of Descartes’ thinking wich is made by professor Polo in Evidencia y realidad en Descartes (and, in general, in all his work) is analysed in this article. The key to understanding Descartes is “the voluntary attitude”, which lies in placing the attention before the arrival of facts and contents of consciousness. So they can be examined and controlled in order to decide if they are reliable or not. The result is an exaggerated dedication which limits the capacity (...) of intelligence to act according to its nature. (shrink)

Abstract: It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are contradictory theories: (...) If moral judgments are descriptive, it is not possible to deduce norms from them. But if one can deduce norms from moral judgments, they are not descriptive. As a solution to this problem, the paper suggests that moral judgments represent institutional facts; the corresponding theory is moral institutionalism. A moral institutional fact – “an act X is Y”, Y” means “morally right” or “morally false” – is a hybrid of descriptive and prescriptive elements: It is stating a fact in descriptive language (“is”) and at the same time, it is short for the prescriptive constitutive rule “X is Y according to the moral rules of the language community C”. Institutional facts contain normative presuppositions without letting them appear in their grammatical form. Institutional facts are now (in relation to the language community C) objective and intersubjective and they can be generalized (cognitive aspect), although they cannot be reduced to brute physical or psychological facts, and it is also possible to deduce norms from them because they are built into them. The meta-ethical concept of moral institutionalism, which is evolved further in the paper, preserves the best intentions of emotivism and cognitivism without leading to contradiction. As a by-product, the article shows exactly the error in J. R. Searle’s alleged counterexample against the so-called naturalistic fallacy from “is” to “ought”. This lies in the normative “are” of the analytic premise or definition in “2a. All promises are [that is ought to be] acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised”. In “Key concepts in philosophy”, Sankt Augustin 2015, institutionalism is explained further (p.184-191) and confined to what Hegel has called “Sittlichkeit” that is customary morality in in distinction to the “morality” of my personal consciousness (p.212-213):. (shrink)

It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are contradictory theories: If (...) moral judgments are descriptive, it is not possible to deduce norms from them. But if one can deduce norms from moral judgments, they are not descriptive. As a solution to this problem, the paper suggests that moral judgments represent institutional facts; the corresponding theory is moral institutionalism. A moral institutional fact – “an act X is Y”, Y means “morally right” or “morally false” – is a hybrid of descriptive and prescriptive elements: It is stating a fact in descriptive language (“is”) and at the same time, it is short for the prescriptive constitutive rule “X is Y according to the moral rules of the language community C”. Institutional facts contain normative presuppositions without letting them appear in their grammatical form. Institutional facts are now (in relation to the language community C) objective and intersubjective and they can be generalized (cognitive aspect), although they cannot be reduced to brute physical or psychological facts, and it is also possible to deduce norms from them because they are built into them. The meta-ethical concept of moral institutionalism, which is evolved further in the paper, preserves the best intentions of emotivism and cognitivism without leading to contradiction. As a by-product, the article shows exactly the still undetected error in J. R. Searle’s alleged counterexample against the so-called naturalistic fallacy from “is” to “ought”. This lies in the normative “are” of the analytic premise or definition in “2a. All promises are [that is ought to be] acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised”. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se analiza la noción de nostalgia de futuro para comprender su significado en el contexto de la filosofía transhumanista y en el de la filosofía de Leonardo Polo. Se ha elegido como representantes del transhumanismo a los que históricamente son sus padres intelectuales: Julian Huxley y Fereidoun M. Esfandiary, quien más tarde cambió su nombre a FM-2030. El objetivo del artículo es analizar las dos filosofías para profundizar en el deseo de trascendencia que cada una (...) desarrolla y ver hasta qué punto es posible un diálogo entre ambas. (shrink)

The interpretation of Descartes' thinking wich is made by professor Polo in Evidencia y realidad en Descartes (and, in general, in all his work) is analysed in this article . The key to understanding Descartes is "the voluntary attitude", which lies in placing the attention before the arrival of facts and contents of consciousness. So they can be examined and controlled in order to decide if they are re-liable or not. The result is an exaggerated dedication which limits the (...) capacity of intelligence to act according to its nature. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta a Weber y Habermas como los umbrales o polos de una modernidad que tiene al progreso como horizonte teórico-práctico. El diagnóstico weberiano sobre la modernidad y su proceso de desencantamiento del mundo y la injustificada reducción de la actividad racional a una actividad u..

Libro sumamente valioso. Tras sendas visiones de conjunto, muy logradas, del positivismo en América Latina en general y en Venezuela en particular, siguen capítulos sobre: Adolfo Ernst; Rafael Villavicencio; Vicente Marcano; Lasandro Alvarado; Luis Razetti; Guillermo Delgado Palacios; Luis López Méndez; José Gil Fortoul; Laureano Vallenilla Lanz; César Zumeta y Manuel Arcaya. Tiende a hacer comparaciones con otras manifestaciones del positivismo latinoamericano"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58.

En este trabajo se desarrolla un examen de lo que Polo llama “devolución del abstracto a la realidad” y lo que Kant denomina “esquematismo”. El objetivo de este análisis es mostrar la razón de ser de las inconmensurables divergencias entre los planteamientos epistemológicos del filósofo madrileño y del filósofo alemán. A raíz de esta diferencia fundamental entre ambos autores aludiré a las diferencias presentes en el modo en que ambos abordan la cuestión de la relación entre lenguaje y realidad.

O artigo tenta diferenciar, caracterizar e ordenar diversas figuras da identidade na fenomenologia pós-husserliana. Em primeiro lugar, assinalam-se questões formuladas pela análise da ipseidade em Heidegger. Em segundo lugar, chama-se a atenção para duas tendências divergentes. Por um lado, Lévinas sustenta que uma fissão da identidade é o resultado da responsabilidade pelos outros, e Waldenfels desenvolve uma lógica da responsividade que questiona o autodesenvolvimento e a autopreservação. Por outro lado, Ricoeur sustenta que o ordenamento da vida num relato equivale a (...) uma identidade narrativa, e M. Henry oferece uma elaborada análise da vida interior como um processo de auto-afecção. Por último, tendo como base as distinções delineadas por X. Zubiri, afirma-se que existem fenômenos que oferecem um sustento a um sentido experiencial da identidade, e que isso pode se vincular à noção husserliana do eu como pólo, isto é, ao ponto de partida dos desenvolvimentos fenomenológicos.El artículo intenta diferenciar, caracterizar y ordenar diversas figuras de la identidad en la fenomenología post-husserliana. En primer lugar, se señalan cuestiones planteadas por el análisis de la ipseidad en Heidegger. En segundo lugar, se presta atención a dos tendencias divergentes. Por un lado, Levinas sostiene que una fisión de la identidad es el resultado de la responsabilidad por lo otros, y Waldenfels desarrolla una lógica de la responsividad que cuestiona el autodesarrollo y la autopreservación. Por otro lado, Ricoeur sostiene que el ordenamiento de la vida en un relato equivale a una identidad narrativa, y M. Henry ofrece un elaborado análisis de la vida interior como un proceso de autoafección. Por último, sobre la base de distinciones delineadas por X. Zubiri, se sostiene que hay fenómenos que ofrecen un sustento a un sentido experiencial de la identidad, y que esto puede vinculares a la noción husserliana de yo como polo, esto es, al punto de partida de los desarrollos fenomenológicos.This article attempts to differentiate, characterize and order various figures of identity in post-Husserlian phenomenology. First, issues raised by Heidegger's analysis of selfhood are pointed out. Secondly, attention is given to two divergent trends. On the one hand, Levinas contends that a fission of identity is the outcome of responsibility for others, and Waldenfels advances a logic of responsiveness that questions self-development and self-preservation. On the other hand, Ricoeur argues that the ordering of life in a story amounts to a narrative identity, and M. Henry affords an elaborate analysis of inward life as a process of self-affection. Finally, on the basis of distinctions outlined by X. Zubiri, it is contended that there are phenomena that uphold an experiential sense of identity. This can be linked to the Husserlian notion of an ego as a pole of acts, i.e., the starting point of phenomenological developments. (shrink)

Este artículo comienza elucidando la noción aristotélica de deseo de saber. Desde ahí, examina las diferencias entre deseo de saber y pretensión intelectual. La pretensión intelectual sustituye, entre los filósofos modernos, la admiración y el deseo de saber clásicos. Por último se centra en un tipo de pretensión intelectual, la pretensión de sí. Para ilustrar tal tipo de pretensión se examina la actitud intelectual hegeliana, y el olvido del ser que comporta.